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Interactive module

Matching Market

Run deferred acceptance and see stable pairs emerge from rankings.

Rule ledger

caseStudents apply to schools, each side ranking the other side differently.
ruleNo blocking pair: no unmatched pair both prefer each other over current matches
questionWhen one strategy changes alone, whose payoff or fairness changes first?

Deferred Acceptance

Mina
Owen
Priya
Priya → North
Mina → River
Owen → Central
North
River
Central

Drag Mina's school ranking

1North
2River
3Central
1

Mina proposes to North.

2

North holds Mina's proposal.

3

Owen proposes to River.

4

River holds Owen's proposal.

5

Priya proposes to River.

6

River rejects Priya.

7

Priya proposes to North.

Stable matching check

Stable

How to read this result

Stable does not mean everyone gets their first choice. It means no unmatched pair would both rather leave their current matches for each other.

Formula

No blocking pair: no unmatched pair both prefer each other over current matches

Stable matching removes pairs who would want to abandon the final assignment.

Step-by-step Explanation

Scenario

Students apply to schools, each side ranking the other side differently.

Why This Matters

Matching algorithms help place doctors, students, organ exchanges, and workers.

Beginner-Friendly Summary

Gale-Shapley turns ranked preferences into matches where no pair has a mutual reason to defect.

Try changing the strategy and watch which result changes first.